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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
X7 
ANTHONY A. SADDLER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20020119-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996), where the defendant in a district court criminal action may take an 
appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final order for anything other than a first degree or 
capital felony offense. In the underlying case related to this appeal, Appellant Anthony 
Saddler was convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute, a third degree felony offense under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) 
(1998). A copy of the judgment is attached hereto as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue presented for review is as follows: Whether the trial court erred in 
upholding the magistrate judge's determination that the detective's affidavit established 
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant for Saddler's home. 
Standard of Review: 
1 
Because this court, like the reviewing court below, is bound by the 
contents of the affidavit, we therefore need not defer to the trial 
court's finding, but rather, we make an independent review of the 
trial court's determination of the sufficiency of the written evidence. 
State v. Weaver. 817 P.2d 830, 833 (Utah Ct. App.1991). However, "the [FJourth 
[AJmendment does not require that the reviewing court conduct a de novo review 
of the magistrate's probable cause determinationf.] [I]nstead, it requires only that 
the reviewing court conclude 'that the magistrate had a substantial basis for... 
[determining] that probable cause existed.'" State v. Babbell 770 P.2d 987, 991 
(Utah 1989) (quoting Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317,2332, 
76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)) (fifth and sixth alterations in original). 
Furthermore, "the reviewing court is required to give great deference to the 
magistrate's determination." State v. White. 851 P.2d 1195, 1198 (Utah 
Ct.App.1993). Great deference is given because '"[a] grudging or negative 
attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants' is inconsistent with the Fourth 
Amendment's strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant." 
Gates. 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S.Ct. at 2331 (citation omitted). 
State v.Deluna, 2001 UT App 401,119-10,40 P.3d 1136. 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
The issue was preserved in the record on appeal at 35-57 and 127. 
RULES. STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following constitutional provision will be determinative of the issue on 
appeal: U.S. Const, amend. IV. The text of that provision is contained in Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings. Disposition in the Court Below. 
On August 4,2000, the state filed an Information against Saddler for unlawful 
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and unlawful possession of cocaine, 
both third degree felony offenses under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) and (2)(a)(i) 
2 
(1998). (R. 1-3.) On August 15,2001, the defense filed a motion to suppress evidence 
of the controlled substances on the basis that the evidence was obtained with an unlawful 
search warrant. Specifically, the defense argued that the affidavit presented to the 
magistrate judge in support of the warrant failed to support probable cause for the search. 
(R. 35-57.) A copy of the affidavit is attached hereto as Addendum C, and a copy of the 
search warrant issued in connection therewith is attached as Addendum D. 
The state opposed the motion and on September 11,2001, a hearing was held in 
the matter. (See R. 60-69; 127.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge denied 
the motion to suppress. (R. 127:12-13.) A copy of the trial judge's ruling is attached 
hereto as Addendum E. 
On September 25,2001, Saddler entered into a conditional plea for possession of 
marijuana, a third degree felony offense, and he specifically reserved the right to appeal 
the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress. (See.generally, R. 80-84; specifically, 
81); see also Utah R. Crim. P. 1 l(i) (2002). After entry of the plea, on January 29,2002, 
the trial court sentenced Saddler to serve an indeterminate prison term of zero to five 
years. The prison term was suspended and Saddler was placed on probation for 24 
months. (R. 107-08.) This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 4,2000, the state filed charges against Saddler for drug possession. 
The charges were based on a "probable cause" statement set forth in the Information: 
3 
The statement of West Valley Police Detective B. McCarthy that on June 15, 
2000, at 3194 South 4300 West, in Salt Lake County, Utah, a search warrant was 
executed at the residence of the defendant, Anthony Alexander Saddler. Detective 
McCarthy states that defendant was present, and that a search of the residence 
revealed 277 grams [a half pound] of field tested positive marijuana, weighing 
scales, and a quantity of a substance that field tested positive for cocaine. 
(R. 3 (emphasis added).) During trial court proceedings, the defense challenged the affi-
davit presented in support of the search warrant referenced above. The defense argued 
that the affidavit lacked probable cause to support issuance of the warrant. (R. 127.) 
During a hearing on the motion to suppress, the parties looked to the four corners 
of the affidavit. The affidavit stated in relevant part the following: 
Your affiant, Detective Bill McCarthy, 8022, is employed by the West 
Valley City Police Department, and is currently assigned to the Neighborhood 
Narcotics Unit. Your affiant has been given the responsibility to investigate 
narcotic offenses occurring in West Valley City and surrounding areas. 
Your affiant has had training in narcotics identification and in the 
investigation of narcotics related offenses. Affiant has personally purchased 
various narcotics on numerous occasions in relation to police investigations. 
Affiant was previously assigned to the Metro narcotics Strike Force and the Drug 
Enforcement Strike Force. Your affiant is a certified peace officer in the State of 
Utah for over 19 years. Your affiant's specialized training includes the DEA basic 
and advanced investigators seminars, as well as the California Narcotics Officers 
Association seminars in drug recognition, identification and investigative 
techniques. Your affiant is also certified in the investigation of Clandestine 
Methamphetamine Laboratories. Your affiant is a certified Bomb Technician. 
Your affiant is investigating Anthony A. Saddler for usage and distribution 
of a controlled substances, specifically marijuana and cocaine. Your affiant 
received information from a confidential informant, hereinafter referred to as CI. 
Your affiant ask[s] the courts not to require your affiant to publish the CFs name. 
Your affiant believes that the CI may be harmed if CFs name were published. 
Your affiant was told the following by the CI: 
1. CI has known the suspect, Saddler for over 1 year, 
2. CI has observed the suspect use cocaine and marijuana on numerous 
occasions during the last year, 
4 
3. CI has used marijuana with the suspect on several occasions, 
4. CI has been to the premises numerous times, the most recent being 
within the last week to ten days, and observed approx. 3 to 4 pounds of marijuana, 
5. CI has observed three scales inside the home, that the suspect uses to 
weigh out repackaged marijuana for resale, 
6. CI has observed cocaine inside the premises, along with packaging 
material, 
7. CI has observed the suspect carry marijuana and cocaine on his person, 
8. The suspect has told the CI that the suspect sells marijuana and cocaine, 
9. CI has observed the suspect sell and use controlled substances, inside 
the named premises, 
10. CI has been told by the suspect that the suspect recently purchased the 
listed premises, 
11. CI states that the suspect's only legitimate source of income is from a 
part time waiter's job at the Salt Lake City restaurant, BACCI's [sic], 
12. CI states that the suspect sells controlled substances to be able to 
afford his own usage and as a separate source of income, 
13. CI provided a description of the home, a vehicle frequently used by the 
suspect (female companion of suspect), and hours of operation for the suspect, 
14. CI states that the suspect is home infrequently and usually during the 
late evening hours, 
The affiant was performing surveillance on the suspect at his home address 
in West Valley on 6/14/00. During the initial surveillance your affiant did not 
observe[] anyone at the residence, the surveillance was intermittent from 2000 
hours until 0600 6/15/00. During surveillance on 6/15/00 your affiant observed 
some short term traffic which your affiant believes was drug related. Your affiant 
had West Valley City Police Patrol perform a traffic stop on one of the vehicles 
leaving the listed premises. During the aforementioned traffic stop the driver was 
arrested for outstanding warrants and later found to be in possession of marijuana, 
approximately one half ounce. During the search of the vehicle a small section of 
plastic bag was found, by affiant, and appears to have residue of cocaine inside 
the twist section of the bag. Your affiant assisted in the search of the vehicle and 
would like to inform the courts that no drag paraphernalia, used in the ingestion of 
marijuana or cocaine, was located. Your affiant was told by the transporting 
officers, of the arrested person, that no drug paraphernalia was found on the 
subject, Oba Tramel. 
Your affiant believes that the observations of the CI are first hand, accurate 
and truth full [sic], for the following reasons. CFs observations are first hand and 
from a person that has used marijuana and would recognized [sic] the substance 
when observed. CI has not been promised nor [sic] paid for any of the 
5 
information provided. CI has provided the information out of a sense of guilt and 
desire to stop the sales and usage of controlled substances into the community. 
CFs observations were over a long period of time, even though the suspect has 
only recently occupied the listed premises, within the last couple of months. CI 
states that the illicit sales operation is ongoing and has been long term. 
Your affiant observed vehicles described by CI at the named premises and 
the registered owner was [as] described by CI. Your affiant has observed what 
your affiant believes to be drug traffic, short term traffic coming and going to the 
listed premises. Further one of the short visitors was stopped and found to be in 
possession of marijuana and packaging material with residue of cocaine. Further 
the arrested person was not found with any instruments used in the ingestion of 
controlled substances, which your affiant believed shows that the marijuana was 
purchased from the listed premises. 
Your affiant was told that the suspect is home infrequently and works at a 
restaurant in Salt Lake City. Your affiant was told that the employment is part 
time, your affiant checked on 6/15/00 and the suspect was not at work and it was 
unknown when he was scheduled to return. 
Your affiant believes that the premises should be searched for marijuana, 
cocaine and associated packaging material and instruments used to ingest 
controlled substances. Affiant has been told that all these items have been 
observed inside the listed premises. Your affiant believes that the suspect should 
be searched, affiant has been told that the suspect sells, uses and carries controlled 
substances on his person. 
Your affiant prays for any time, announced authority of service. Your 
affiant has been told that the suspect is usually only at home during the late 
evening hours and your affiant's observations have confirmed this. 
Your affiant has reviewed the attached affidavit with Deputy Salt Lake 
County District Attorney B. Kent Morgan and it has ben [sic] approved to be 
presented to the courts for anytime and announced authority of service. 
(R. 72-74.) Also, according to the record, the magistrate issued the warrant and 
McCarthy executed it on June 15 "in the day time[]." (R. 76-78; 3). 
At the conclusion of the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court denied 
the motion. Saddler maintains that the trial court erred in its ruling. The affidavit was 
insufficient for issuance of a search warrant. The ruling on the motion to suppress must 
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be reversed, as further set forth below. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
According to the law, an affidavit filed in support of a search warrant must 
establish probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime will be found in a particular 
place. To that end, the affidavit must establish the veracity, reliability and basis of know-
ledge of the person supplying information to the affiant; and it must contain detailed 
facts of criminal conduct, and information to support an adequate police investigation. 
In this matter, Detective McCarthy prepared an affidavit for a search warrant 
based on information from an unidentified "confidential informant" or "CI." McCarthy's 
affidavit failed to support probable cause. 
Specifically, as set forth herein, the affidavit failed to support the veracity and 
reliability of the informant. There is no indication on the record in this case that the 
informant identified him- herself to McCarthy, met with McCarthy in person, or provided 
any detailed information. The affidavit reflects only vague, broad allegations from a 
member of the criminal sector, who refused to be involved or identified. In addition, the 
allegations in the affidavit are general. The broadly-worded assertions fail to lend cre-
dence to the report or to the informant. Finally, McCarthy's independent investigation 
failed to uncover criminal conduct involving Saddler or his residence. On that basis, the 
affidavit must be deemed insufficient to support probable cause for the search warrant. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN DENYING SADDLER'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS. 
A. THE PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARD REQUIRES SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE AND RELIABLE INFORMATION. 
The Fourth Amendment to the federal constitution requires that "probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation" be established prior to the issuance of a warrant. U.S. 
Const. IV. "[W]hen a search warrant is issued on the basis of an affidavit, that affidavit 
must contain specific facts sufficient to support a determination by a neutral magistrate 
that probable cause exists." State v. Babbell. 770 P.2d 987, 990-91 (Utah 1989) (quoting 
State v. Nielsen. 727 P.2d 188,190 (Utah 1986), cert, denied. 480 U.S. 930 (1987)). The 
standard requires sufficient evidence to support "a fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." State v. Droneburg. 781 P.2d 
1303,1304 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213,238 (1983)). 
A warrant issued without probable cause is unlawful. 
Probable cause is determined under a "totality-of-the-circumstances" analysis. 
State v. Singleton. 854 P.2d 1017,1019-20 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Gates. 462 
U.S. at 238) (footnotes omitted);1 see also State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256,1259-62 
1 In Gates. 462 U.S. 213, the United States Supreme Court "expressly abandoned 
application" of a previously used, "Aguilar-Spinelli 'two-pronged test'" in favor of the 
"totality-of-the-circumstances test." Singleton. 854 P.2d at 1019-20 (quoting Gates, 462 
U.S. at 238). As this Court stated, 
Prior to Gates, the Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged analysis required that an affidavit 
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(Utah 1993); State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130-31 (Utah 1987); State v. Bailev. 675 
P.2d 1203,1205 (Utah 1984); State v. Brown. 798 P.2d 284 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State 
v. Purser. 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Droneburg. 781 P.2d at 1304. 
Under that analysis, Utah courts assess whether an affidavit contains detailed, 
relevant facts concerning the informant and the alleged criminal conduct. Babbell 770 
P.2d at 990-91; Droneburg. 781 P.2d at 1304-05; Gates. 462 U.S. at 239. This Court has 
stated the following with regard to the probable-cause standard: 
Factors to consider in determining whether probable cause exists include an 
informant's veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge. Gates, 462 U.S. at 233, 
103 S.Ct. at 2329; State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 286 (Utah App. 1990). In some cases, the circumstances 
may require the supporting affidavit to set forth in detail the basis of knowledge, 
veracity and reliability of a person supplying information in order to establish 
probable cause. State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Utah 1984). In other cases, 
if the circumstances as a whole demonstrate the truthfulness of the informant's 
report, a less strong showing is required. Id. at 1205-06. For example, reliability 
and veracity are generally assumed when the informant is a citizen who receives 
nothing from the police in exchange for the information. See Bailey, 675 P.2d at 
1206; Brown, 798 P.2d at 286; State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 57-58 (Utah 
App.1989), cert denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). Courts have also 
relying on information received from an informant provide the magistrate with (1) 
the basis upon which the informant concludes that contraband is to be found at the 
site to be searched and (2) the basis upon which the affiant believes the informant 
is credible or that the informant's information is reliable. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 
U.S. 108,114, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 1514, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964). See Spinelli v. United 
States, 393 U.S. 410,415-16, 89 S.Ct. 584, 588-89, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). In 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), the United 
States Supreme Court rejected the Aguilar-Spinelli approach and announced [the 
totality-of-the-circumstances analysis]. 
Salt Lake Citv v.Truiillo. 854 P.2d 603, 607 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
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consistently approved the issuance of search warrants where the informant's 
knowledge is based on personal observation. See Hansen, 732 P.2d at 130; 
Brown, 798 P.2d at 287; Stromberg, 783 P.2d at 57. Further buttressing 
reliability is the detail with which an informant describes the facts set forth in the 
affidavit and independent corroboration of the significant facts by police. See 
Anderson, 701 P.2d at 1102; Bailey, 675 P.2d at 1206; Brown, 798 P.2d at 287. 
Purser, 828 P.2d at 517; see also, Singleton, 854 P.2d at 1020,1021 (Utah courts have 
used "the Aguilar-Spinelli factors as guides in applying the totality-of-the-circumstances 
test. '[A]n informant's "reliability" and "basis of knowledge" are but two relevant 
considerations'"; court also considered the officer's surveillance and other investigative 
techniques to find probable cause under the totality of the circumstances); Bailey, 675 
P.2d at 1205 ("Depending on the circumstances, a showing of the basis of knowledge and 
veracity or reliability of the person providing the information for the warrant may well be 
necessary to establish with a 'fair probability that the evidence actually exists and can be 
found where the informant says'"); Brown, 798 P.2d at 286; State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 
1099, 1102 (Utah 1985). In sum, the affidavit must contain sufficient information to 
support the reliability of the informant, particular details regarding the matter, and 
information to support an adequate police investigation. 
In State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203, the Utah Supreme Court found that the affidavit 
for the search warrant supported probable cause where it established the informant's 
veracity, reliability, and basis oj knowledge, as follows: 
According to the affidavit [in Bailey], the informant had previously given 
truthful information to the police concerning the existence of contraband, an 
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accepted method for establishing an informant's veracity. See McCray v. Illinois, 
386 U.S. 300, 87 S.Ct. 1056,18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967), where the United States 
Supreme Court held there was a sufficient basis for probable cause of an arrest 
because the informant had a history of giving reliable information to the police. 
Furthermore, the reliability of the informant's statement was "boosted by 
the detail with which the informant described his personal observation" of the 
stolen property and the apartment. State v. Romero, Utah, 660 P.2d 715, 719 
(1983). In addition, some weight should be accorded the fact that the informant, 
an apparently disinterested person, came to the police and volunteered the 
information. The informant gave his name, phone, address, and place of 
employment. He stated that he was a concerned citizen who wanted to stop 
burglaries and thefts. In State v. Treadway, 28 Utah 2d 160,499 P.2d 846, 848 
(1972), we held that information from citizen informants who stand to gain 
nothing from providing information to the police is not viewed with the same 
rigid scrutiny as is the testimony of a regular police informant. 
Bailey. 675 P.2d at 1206. There, veracity and reliability were relevant factors. 
Next, in State v. Droneburg. 781 P.2d 1303, this Court emphasized the continuing 
need for officers to include specific facts in an affidavit for a search warrant. With 
respect to that factor, the Court stated the following: 
"The fourth amendment requires that when a search warrant is issued on the basis 
of an affidavit, that affidavit must contain specific facts sufficient to support a de-
termination by a neutral magistrate that probable cause exists." The action of the 
magistrate, however, must not be "a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of 
others." Otherwise, the magistrate becomes only a "rubber stamp" for police, 
abandoning the neutral and detached role which is "a more reliable safeguard 
against improper searches than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer." 
Droneburg. 781 P.2d at 1304 (citations omitted). There, this Court held that the affidavit 
for the search warrant failed to establish probable cause where it contained conclusory 
statements. LdL at 1305. Also, under a separate probable-cause determination, the Court 
ruled that ,f[n]either the credibility of the informant nor the reliability of the information 
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was ever established." IdL 
Finally, in Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, the United States Supreme Court 
emphasized the importance of independent police investigation and corroboration in the 
probable-cause analysis. In that case, police officers received an anonymous letter 
containing detailed information about defendants' drug trafficking. The letter specified 
where Lance and Sue Gates lived and it identified how they made their drug buys. The 
letter informed police that the Gateses would be involved in the next transaction in 
Florida on May 3 and they would be transporting $100,000.00 in drugs in their car, from 
Florida to Illinois. Also, the Gateses presently had over $100,000.00 worth of drugs in 
their home and the home was frequented by "big drug dealers." Gates. 462 U.S. at 225. 
"[T]he anonymous letter contained a range of details relating not just to easily obtained 
facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip, but to future actions of third parties 
ordinarily not easily predicted." Id, at 245. 
In connection with receiving the letter, officers engaged in an independent 
investigation. They confirmed Lance Gates' identification and address, they used a 
confidential informant to secure additional personal information about the couple, and 
they coordinated with police at the O'Hare airport regarding Lance Gates' flight plans 
and arrangements. They worked with drug enforcement agents to keep surveillance on 
the flight, and they maintained surveillance on the couple to confirm the basic facts in the 
letter. Id. at 225-26. After officers had engaged in an independent investigation and 
12 
confirmed information, they submitted to the magistrate an affidavit detailing their 
investigations together with the anonymous letter. The magistrate issued a search 
warrant. Id. at 226. 
In reviewing the matter, the United States Supreme Court specified that "standing 
alone, the anonymous letter sent to the Bloomingdale Police Department would not pro-
vide the basis for a magistrate's determination that there was probable cause to believe 
contraband would be found in the Gates' car and home." Gates. 462 U.S. at 227. How-
ever, a review of the matter under the totality of the circumstances supported the standard. 
The Court found that the detailed, anonymous tips, supplemented by the 
independent police investigation established probable cause. "Our decisions applying the 
totality of the circumstances analysis outlined above have consistently recognized the 
value of corroboration of details of an informant's tip by independent police work" Id. at 
241 (emphasis added). The officers' investigation corroborated facts which could not be 
generally known. Through their investigative efforts, the officers confirmed unique and 
suspicious information and satisfied any deficiencies that existed in the letter. 
In Saddler's case, the threshold issue is whether the affidavit, when read in a 
common-sense manner under the total circumstances, established probable cause for 
issuance of the warrant. In considering the matter, the trial court ruled as follows: 
As set forth in today's memorandum, the magistrate does make a [common sense] 
determination [that] probable cause exists[;] let's look at the totality of the circum-
stances. I have reviewed now the affidavit that supports the search warrant. I've 
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read both memorandums. In this particular case you have an experienced police 
officer, Officer McCarthy. He indicates that he has 19 years of experience. He 
indicates that there are a number of matters besides the affidavit. The most telling 
certainly is that Paragraph 4, the CI identifies numerous times, the most recent 
being within the last week that he had observed three to four pounds of marijuana. 
I agree with Ms. Romero that many of the other allegations are rather broad 
and vague and without Paragraph 4, (inaudible) issue, it would not support the 
issuance of the search warrant but I'm thinking you have to look at the other 
allegations which are very general in conjunction with Paragraph 4 which is very 
specific. In this particular case, the confidential informant indicates that [] within 
a week to ten days, he says there was three to four pounds of marijuana in the 
defendant's residence. The detective does not simply take that at face value. He 
does some corroboration of (inaudible) surveillance of suspect at his home address 
in West Valley on June 14th. Surveillance on, it looks like June 15th. On June 15th 
he observes short term traffic which (inaudible) believes were drug related. It goes 
on to explain that. Based on all the circumstances with the totality of the situation, 
I do believe that Judge Maughn was justified in issuing the search warrant; 
therefore, I am denying the Motion to Suppress. 
(R. 127:12-13.) The trial judge did not enter specific findings of fact on the issue.2 The 
2 Findings apparently are unnecessary. In Deluna, this Court stated that since it is 
bound on review "by the contents of the affidavit," it will not defer to the trial court's 
findings, but rather, "we make an independent review of the trial court's determination of 
the sufficiency of the written [affidavit] evidence." Deluna, 2001 UT App 401, ^ [9 (citing 
Weaver. 817 P.2d at 833). That is appropriate since neither the magistrate nor the trial 
judge here took evidence, observed witnesses, or made credibility determinations. 
Indeed, in Saddler's case, this Court is assessing the evidence in its original form, as it 
was presented to the magistrate judge on June 15, 2000, and the trial judge thereafter. 
This Court also ruled that the "independent review" identified above does not 
require a "de novo review of the magistrate's probable cause determination^]" Rather, it 
requires only that this Court assess whether "a substantial basis" exists to support 
probable cause. Deluna, 2001 UT App 401, ^9 (citing BabbelL 770 P.2d at 991). "In 
conducting this review, we will consider the search warrant affidavit in 'its entirety and in 
a common sense fashion' and give 'great deference' to the magistrate's decision. The 
affidavit must support the magistrate's decision that there is a 'fair probability' that 
evidence of the crime will be found in the place or places named in the warrant." State v. 
Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1259-60 (Utah 1993). 
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judge simply reviewed the information in the affidavit for the warrant and upheld it as 
sufficient to support probable cause. The trial court's ruling was incorrect. The affidavit 
was deficient, as further set forth below. 
B. THE AFFIDAVIT HERE LACKED ANY INFORMATION TO SUPPORT 
THE VERACITY AND RELIABILITY OF THE CONFIDENTIAL 
INFORMANT. AND IT LACKED DETAILED INFORMATION. IN 
ADDITION. THE DETECTIVE'S INVESTIGATION WAS INADEQUATE. 
On appeal, this Court will assess the totality of the circumstances to determine if 
McCarthy's affidavit was sufficient to support probable cause. To that end, this Court 
will consider whether the affidavit established the "informant's veracity, reliability and 
basis of knowledge." Purser, 828 P.2d at 517; see also Bailev. 675 P.2d at 1206 
(assessing the "veracity" of the informant to find probable cause). This Court will assess 
the "detail with which [the] informant describe[d] the facts set forth in the affidavit." 
Purser. 828 P.2d at 517; Droneburg. 781 P.2d at 1303-04 (emphasizing the need for 
specific detail to support probable cause). 
Also, this Court will consider whether the officer engaged in any relevant 
independent investigation of pertinent facts. Purser. 828 P.2d at 517; Gates. 462 U.S. at 
241 (emphasizing the importance of independent police investigation and corroboration); 
see also Deluna, 2001 UT App 401 (considering the "type of informant"; "information 
detail"; and "confirmation by police officer"). 
Based on a review of those factors under the totality of the circumstances, this 
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Court should find that the affidavit failed to support probable cause, as set forth below. 
The warrant was unlawful, and the search conducted in connection therewith violated the 
Fourth Amendment. 
1. The Informant Was a Member of the Criminal Sector. 
(a) Veracity and Reliability. 
Under the "veracity" and "reliability" analysis, this Court will consider whether the 
informant's veracity may be "assumed," or whether the officer seeking the warrant was 
required specifically to establish the veracity of the informant and the reliability of the 
informant's report. See Purser. 828 P.2d at 517. 
To begin, in some instances, if an informant is an ordinary, disinterested citizen, 
who has no personal ties to or motives in reporting the alleged crime, Utah courts may 
assume reliability and veracity. See Bailey. 675 P.2d at 1206 (an identified, disinterested 
informant was considered reliable); Deluna. 2001 UT App 401, % 14; Kaysville v. 
Mulcahv. 943 P.2d 231,235 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), cert, denied. 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 
1997) (an identified, concerned and uninvolved citizen called in drunk driving tip to 
police); St. George v. Carter. 945 P.2d 165,167,169 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), cert, denied. 
953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1998) (Rick Hafen, an uninvolved citizen and restaurant employee, 
called in a report of a person at the drive-up window with an open container; this Court 
considered Hafen to be reliable because he gave his name and was disinterested). This 
case does not present that situation. 
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Here, Detective McCarthy prepared an affidavit for a search warrant based on in-
formation he obtained from a "confidential informant" or "CI." The affidavit reveals very 
little about the CI. (See R. 72-74.) 
Specifically, it states the following: McCarthy "received information" in an 
undisclosed form from the CI; the CI used drugs on several occasions; the CI was familiar 
with the use and possession of drugs; the CI allegedly observed Saddler use, sell, and 
possess drugs; and the CI allegedly was familiar with Saddler's home and a vehicle he 
used. According to the affidavit, the informant was not promised or paid any reward for 
his/her information, and he/she disclosed information to McCarthy out of a sense of guilt. 
(R. 72-73.) 
The affidavit fails to support that the informant was an ordinary, disinterested 
citizen. Here, the CI was a member of the criminal sector. 
In State v. Stevens, 989 S.W.2d 290 (Tenn. 1999), the Tennessee Supreme Court 
articulated the distinction between an ordinary "citizen informant" and an informant who 
has ties to the criminal sector. In Stevens, an informant contacted police, and reported to 
officers that defendant was involved in operating a clandestine methamphetamine 
laboratory at a specific address. The informant described equipment used for the meth 
operation and he described the cooking process. Based on the information, the officers 
obtained a warrant and executed it against defendant's residence. IcLat 292. 
In assessing the matter on appeal, the court refused to assume reliability/veracity 
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since the informant was a member of the criminal sector. IdLat 294. The court stated that 
information from an ordinary citizen is presumed to be reliable, and the affidavit need 
not establish that the source is credible or that information is reliable, id.at 291, while 
information from a member of the criminal sector, who may be seeking some concession, 
is not entitled to the presumption. "The nature of these [latter] persons and the informa-
tion which they supply convey a certain impression of unreliability, and it is proper to 
demand that some evidence of their credibility and reliability be shown." Id. at 294. 
Stevens supports that when an informant is involved in criminal conduct and gains 
his knowledge through that involvement, he is not entitled to the presumption of reli-
ability. The affidavit must contain specific information to support the credibility of the 
informant in that instance. See State v. MickeL 765 P.2d 331,332-33 (Wash. App. 1989) 
(informant was not deemed to be reliable where she had unexplained association with 
crime); also Mulcahv, 943 P.2d at 235 n.2 (a person who gains information through in-
volvement in criminal activity is lower on the reliability scale); Bailey. 675 P.2d at 1205. 
Since McCarthy obtained information from a member of the criminal sector, he 
was required to establish in the affidavit the veracity of the informant and the credibility 
of the allegations. Veracity and reliability may be established in various ways. For 
example, if the affidavit reflects that the informant gave her name and identifying 
information to the detective, that may support veracity since the informant has "subjected 
[herself] to a penalty for providing false information." Deluna, 2001 UT App 401, [^15. 
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In this case, there is no indication that the CI gave his/her name or relevant 
identifying information to McCarthy. Although McCarthy stated in the affidavit that he 
did not want to publish the CFs name, McCarthy did not indicate whether he even had 
that information. That is, McCarthy did not reveal whether the CI provided his/her 
name. (See R. 70-74 (also, while McCarthy expressed his belief that the CI may be 
harmed, there is no indication that the CI held such a belief).) Thus, there is no basis to 
find that the CI was willing to risk "penalty for providing false information" here. 
Deluna. 2001 UT App 401, Tfl5. 
Also, if the affidavit reflects that the informant initiated contact and met with the 
officers to report the alleged criminal conduct, that may lend support to veracity and 
reliability. See Bailey, 675 P.2d at 1206; State v. Treadwav. 499 P.2d 846, 848 (Utah 
1972); State v. Harris. 671 P.2d 175,177 (Utah 1983) (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, Search 
& Seizure. § 3.3 (1978)): see also Purser. 828 P.2d at 517-18; Brown. 798 P.2d at 286; 
Stromberg, 783 P.2d at 55. 
In Bailey. Treadwav. Harris. Purser. Brown, and Stromberg. the officers included 
information in the affidavit to support the veracity of the informant, where the informant 
had specifically identified himself to the officer, and/or the informant was personally 
available to the officer. See Bailey. 675 P.2d at 1206 (informant, who had previously 
given truthful information to police, approached police, volunteered information, and 
gave his name, phone, address and place of employment to officer); Treadwav. 499 P.2d 
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at 848 (the informant, Poulsen, had no personal interest in whether defendant was arrested 
or not); Harris, 671 P.2d at 177 (the informant, Knight, met with officers and pointed out 
criminal conduct occurring in defendant's backyard); Purser. 828 P.2d at 518 (the con-
fidential informant met with officers and assisted them in controlled drug buys); Brown. 
798 P.2d at 286 (citizen initiated contact with officers and volunteered information); 
Stromberg. 783 P.2d at 55 (informant met with officers and disclosed personal 
observations relating to defendant's drug use). Also, if the affidavit reflects that the 
informant has a history of reliability with the officer and/or the officer was able to 
confirm the informant's past reputation as reliable, the informant's credibility may be 
established. See Bailev. 675 P.2d at 1206; McCrav v. Illinois. 386 U.S. 300 (1967) 
(informant's reliability established with record of past performance). 
Those facts do not exist in this case. The affidavit here fails to indicate how 
McCarthy came into contact with the informant. It fails to disclose whether the CI 
initiated contact with McCarthy, whether the CI identified him- herself to McCarthy, 
whether McCarthy and the CI spoke in person, or whether the informant left a note for 
McCarthy with or without a signature and/or return address. The affidavit also fails to 
disclose whether McCarthy had prior dealings with the CI or whether he conducted any 
research into the CI's history. 
Finally, courts consider whether the informant was merely a witness to the 
20 
criminal activity, since that may support veracity and reliability. See Deluna, 2001 UT 
App 401417 (citing Mulcahv. 943 P.2d at 235 n.2). In Deluna. this Court considered an 
informant to be reliable where she had been present during methamphetamine production 
and simply observed the process. The Court ruled that under the facts, "Niece #2" was 
merely a witness, thereby lending credibility to her report. Deluna, 2001 UT App 401, 
f 17; see also State v. Blaha. 851 P.2d 1205,1207-08 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (informant 
drove with husband, who went inside apartment to buy drugs; informant was not present 
during crime, and informant identified herself to McCarthy); State v. White, 851 P.2d 
1195 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (same). 
The informant in Saddler's case was not a mere witness to criminal conduct. The 
affidavit reveals that the unnamed CI used drugs. (See R. 72, % 3 (CI used drugs with 
suspect)); Treadwav. 499 P.2d at 848 (recognizing that "unnamed police informers" 
frequently are criminals and require proof of credibility or reliability). 
Also, while Detective McCarthy stated in the affidavit that the CI was not pro-
mised or paid any reward for the information (R. 73 ("CI has not been promised [or] paid 
for any of the information")), there is no indication as to whether the informant was able 
to avoid prosecution for his/her alleged criminal conduct either in exchange for the 
information to McCarthy or by making an anonymous report. Indeed, the circumstances 
leave an impression that the informant escaped prosecution, where he/she retained 
anonymity and/or cooperated to curry favor with the police and prosecution. 
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In short, the affidavit here lacks pertinent information about the CI. This Court has 
refused to find probable cause where the affidavit lacked detail about the informant. In 
Droneburg. the sheriff prepared an affidavit for a search warrant based on the following: 
Garfield County Sheriff Robert Judd received information from a confidential 
informant on April 24,1987, that methamphetamine, a controlled substance, was 
to be delivered to a residence in Panguitch, Utah. On April 28, the informant 
further advised the Sheriff that the individual delivering the methamphetamine had 
departed California and was to arrive in Panguitch between 2:00 and 4:00 p.m. 
Droneburg. 781 P.2d at 1303. The sheriff represented in the affidavit that "his request for 
a warrant was based on '[information from [a] reliable informant... that a supply of 
illegal substances is coming in.' The Sheriff believed the information to be reliable 
because he had 'used this confidential informant before and [had] found them [sic] to be 
reliable.'" Id, at 1303. Thereafter, a warrant was issued for the residence and all vehicles. 
At approximately 3:00 p.m., a pickup truck with California license plates pulled 
into the driveway of the residence. The officer questioned an occupant of the truck and 
became satisfied that the occupant's route and arrival corroborated the information from 
the informant. The officer executed the warrant against the truck and discovered drug 
paraphernalia, marijuana, and traces of methamphetamine. Id. at 1304. 
On appeal, the state conceded that the warrant was unlawful. Nevertheless, the 
state claimed the search was justified under an exception to the warrant requirement that 
required proof of probable cause. This Court rejected the state's claim as follows: 
Sheriff Judd obtained information from a confidential informant that a delivery of 
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controlled substances was expected. Neither the credibility of the informant nor 
the reliability of the information was ever established. The record reveals nothing 
to indicate how, when, or where the information was obtained. Sheriff Judd 
stated that he had used the informant previously and found "them" to be reliable, 
but there is no indication as to how many times this occurred, when it last 
occurred, the circumstances, or even whether one or more informants were 
involved. Although the veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge of 
confidential informants are no longer strict prerequisites for establishing probable 
cause, they are still "relevant considerations, among others, in determining the 
existence of probable cause under fa totality-of-the-circumstances.f " State v. 
Hansen, 732 P.2d 127,130 (Utah 1987) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 233-34, 103 
S.Ct. at 2329-30, 76 L.Ed.2d 527). Otherwise, a court cannot determine whether 
the information was obtained in the context of unreliable circumstances such as 
casual rumor. See, e.g., Spinelliv. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416, 89 S.Ct. 584, 
589,21L.Ed.2d637(1969). 
Droneburg. 781 P.2d at 1305-06 (emphasis added). 
The affidavit in Saddler's case contains no information to support the CI's 
veracity, or the reliability of his/her information to the detective. The record reveals 
nothing about how, when or where McCarthy obtained the information from the CI; how 
the detective came into contact with the CI; whether the CI met with the detective in 
person or contacted him surreptitiously; whether the CI identified him- herself to the 
detective; whether the detective had any prior or related dealings with the CI; whether the 
detective did any investigation into the veracity of the CI; whether the CI had a history of 
providing false/true reports of criminal conduct; whether the CI had a criminal record of 
his/her own; whether the CI could be found and held accountable if his/her report in this 
case proved to be false; or whether the CI was arrested/prosecuted as a result of the 
admissions he/she made concerning his/her involvement in the criminal conduct. 
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In the end, the informant in this case is as mysterious as an anonymous letter. See 
Gates, 462 U.S. at 227 (the United States Supreme Court considered the detailed 
information in an anonymous letter to be insufficient to support the reliability of the 
informant(s) or to support probable cause).3 The lack of information about the CI conveys 
a certain impression of unreliability that is not resolved on this affidavit. 
M[N]either the credibility of the informant nor the reliability of the information was 
ever established." Droneburg, 781 P.2d at 1306; id. at 1303 (the officer, who prepared 
the affidavit, knew the confidential informant and considered him to be reliable because 
he had "used this confidential informant before"; that was insufficient.) "The record 
reveals nothing to indicate how, when, or where the information was obtained." Id. at 
1306. That is insufficient to support probable cause. 
(b) Basis of Knowledge. 
In this case, "basis of knowledge" arguably was established in part where some of 
the information outlined in the affidavit "came from the [] informant's] personal obser-
3 The term "anonymous" means "1 with no name known or acknowledged 2 given, 
written, etc. by a person whose name is withheld or unknown 3 not easily distinguished 
from others or from one another because of lack of individual features or character." 
Webster's New World College Dictionary, 58 (4th ed. 1999). That definition fits the 
circumstances surrounding the CI in this case. There is no name acknowledged, no 
information to support that the CI's name was known, and no information concerning the 
CI's individual features or character. 
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vations." Dehma, 2001 UT App 401,1fl3.4 
Even if "basis of knowledge" may be established, that factor alone is insufficient to 
give credibility to the CI or to the CI's report. In this case, the magistrate had no basis 
for finding the informant trustworthy. (See supra subpoint B.l .(a).) There was no reason 
for the magistrate to believe that items of criminal conduct could be found in places 
identified by the CI since veracity and reliability were lacking. 
In State v. Novembrino. 519 A.2d 820 (N.J. 1987), the New Jersey Supreme Court 
stated the following: 
[T]he unidentified informant's conclusory allegations that "Otto usually keeps the 
drugs in the gas station" and that he "witnessed Otto dealing drugs" are 
unsupported by any specific facts from which a neutral judge could independently 
derive a reasonable suspicion that a search would yield evidence of criminal 
activity. The fact that a police officer may be willing to believe the tip of an 
informant-particularly one who has been helpful on prior occasions—does not 
lessen the judge's duty to scrutinize the substance of the tip in order to weigh its 
sufficiency against the practical standard of probable cause. As Justice Jacobs 
observed in State v. Macri, [39 NJ. 250, 188 A.2d 389 (1963),] "Before the judge 
4 The affidavit alleges that the CI made certain observations. (See R. 73-74, ^ flj 2, 5, 6, 
9.) Those observations may support "basis of knowledge" under Dehma, 2001 UT App 
401, %l3. Also, where the "suspect" made incriminating statements to the CI, that may be 
sufficient to support "basis of knowledge." See Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(3) (2002). 
The affidavit also contains allegations that lack any information relevant to basis 
of knowledge. Paragraphs 11 and 12 assert that "the suspect's only legitimate source of 
income is from a part time waiter's job" at a downtown restaurant, and "the suspect sells 
controlled substances to be able to afford his own usage and as a separate source of in-
come." (R. 73.) While McCarthy attributes those statements to the CI, there is no 
indication in the affidavit as to how the CI learned the information. The CI did not claim 
that he/she had personal knowledge of the facts or that he/she obtained the information 
from any relevant source. Consequently, paragraphs 11 and 12 must be disregarded as 
speculative and insupportable. 
25 
is in a position to make his determination for issuance, he must properly be made 
aware of the underlying facts or circumstances which would warrant a prudent 
man in believing that the law was being violated.n 39 N.J. at 257, 188 A 2d 389. 
Here, the informant's tip is a bald conclusion, allegedly based on personal 
observation, but unsupported by any reference to dates, events, or circumstances. 
Id at 838 (emphasis added). 
In this case, the CPs allegations of "first-hand" knowledge are bald conclusions, 
as set forth below. (See infra subpoint B.2.) Where the circumstances in this case fail to 
support veracity, and the allegations lack detail (see supra, subpoint B.l.(a), and infra 
subpoint B.2.), the "basis of knowledge" factor likewise must fail, and cannot sustain 
probable cause. 
2. The Affidavit Lacked Sufficient Detail to Support Probable Cause. 
This Court will consider whether the affidavit contained sufficient detail about the 
alleged criminal conduct to support a warrant. See Droneburg. 781 P.2d at 1303; Dehma, 
2001 UTApp 401,1fl9. 
In Droneburg. as stated above, a sheriff prepared an affidavit for a warrant based 
on an informant's initial and subsequent report that methamphetamine was to be delivered 
to a particular residence in Panguitch, Utah. The sheriff had worked with the informant 
in the past and considered him to be reliable. The informant advised the sheriff that the 
individual delivering the methamphetamine to the residence "had departed California and 
was to arrive in Panguitch between 2:00 and 4:00 p.m." Droneburg, 781 P.2d at 1303. 
The sheriff obtained a warrant for the residence and vehicles based on that information 
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and ultimately executed the warrant and arrested the defendant. 
On appeal, this Court ruled that the allegations of criminal conduct lacked 
sufficient detail to support probable cause. The affidavit was based on conclusions. Id. at 
1304 (ruling that the action of the magistrate "must not be 4a mere ratification of the bare 
conclusions of others5"); Babbell. 770 P.2d at 990. 
In this case, sufficient details are lacking to support probable cause. The affidavit 
fails to contain any information about the CI or his/her encounter with McCarthy (see 
supra, subpoint B.I.). In addition, the claims of criminal conduct are non-specific, "bare 
conclusions." The allegations of criminal conduct set forth in the affidavit are as follows: 
1. CI has known the suspect, Saddler for over 1 year, 
2. CI has observed the suspect use cocaine and marijuana on numerous occasions 
during the last year, 
3. CI has used marijuana with the suspect on several occasions, 
4. CI has been to the premises numerous times, the most recent being within the 
last week to ten days, and observed approx. 3 to 4 pounds of marijuana, 
5. CI has observed three scales inside the home, that the suspect uses to weigh out 
repackaged marijuana for resale, 
6. CI has observed cocaine inside the premises, along with packaging material, 
7. CI has observed the suspect carry marijuana and cocaine on his person, 
8. The suspect has told the CI that the suspect sells marijuana and cocaine, 
9. CI has observed the suspect sell and use controlled substances, inside the 
named premises, 
10. CI has been told by the suspect that the suspect recently purchased the listed 
premises, 
11. CI states that the suspect's only legitimate source of income is from a part 
time waiter's job at the Salt Lake City restaurant, BACCFs [sic], 
12. CI states that the suspect sells controlled substances to be able to afford his 
own usage and as a separate source of income, 
13. CI provided a description of the home, a vehicle frequently used by the 
suspect (female companion of suspect), and hours of operation for the suspect, 
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14. CI states that the suspect is home infrequently and usually during the late 
evening hours[.] 
(R. 72-73.) Some of the numbered paragraphs are variations on the same theme. (See 
e.g., R. 72-73, ffl[2, 3,9 (alleging use of controlled substances).) 
In essence, the numbered paragraphs allege the following: the CI knew the suspect 
for more than a year (R. 72, ^ 1); the suspect used drugs on unspecified occasions and at 
his home (R. 72-73, f|f2, 7, 9); the CI used drugs (R. 72, ^ 3); the CI observed the suspect 
in possession of packaging material and drugs (R. 72, ffl| 4, 5, 6); the suspect sold drugs 
from the home on some unspecified occasion(s) (R. 72, <[fl[5, 6, 8); the suspect recently 
purchased the home, worked at a downtown restaurant and drove a vehicle (R. 73, THJ10, 
11, 13); and the suspect was home infrequently, he kept "hours of operation," and he 
"usually" was home late in the evening. (R. 73, ffl[13,14.) 
The allegations of criminal conduct in this case are conclusory. Also, they are 
written in the past tense without any reference to time. Specifically, paragraphs 2, 3, 5,6, 
7, 8, and 9 discuss general drug/paraphernalia use and possession at unspecified times 
that may span "over 1 year" (R. 72, ^ fl), and they allege conduct under unspecified 
circumstances. The allegations raise questions as to what was observed, when it was 
observed, what the drugs looked like (crystal, rock, or powder form; plant, or dried 
leaves), who was present, how events appeared or transpired, what was said, and what 
the informant's involvement was. There is no detail or description of unique and 
28 
distinctive events to lend credence to the vague allegations.5 
Next, Paragraphs 10 and 13 contain general, innocuous allegations that cannot be 
confirmed or connected to any criminal conduct due to the lack of detail. For example, 
according to paragraph 10, Saddler told the CI that he recently purchased the home 
identified in the affidavit. That does not support criminal conduct. (See supra note 4, 
herein.) In addition, the allegation is hearsay. 
According to paragraph 13, the CI provided "a description of the home," and the 
vehicle used by Saddler. (R. 73, ^ 13.) Although the affidavit contains an address for the 
residence (R. 70), the affidavit fails to disclose whether the CI provided any relevant 
description of the house or car. See Babbell. 770 P.2d at 991, 992 (finding detail suf-
ficient where affidavit "set out specifically and in detail the characteristics of the truck as 
described by the witnesses, including the make, approximate year, four-wheel-drive 
equipment, color, missing bumpers, cracked windshield, orange seat covers, and '55 mph 
sucks' button on the driver's visor"). If the CI had identified a unique characteristic of 
the residence or vehicle, that information might lend credibility to the report. As it 
stands, the allegations constitute general observations. They add nothing to the analysis. 
The CI also allegedly disclosed the "hours of operation for the suspect," and that 
"the suspect is home infrequently and usually during the late evening hours." (R. 73, ffl] 
13,14.) The affidavit fails to specify the "hours of operation," thus, again lacking detail. 
5 With respect to the assertions at paragraphs 11 and 12, see supra, note 4, herein. 
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In the end, the only allegation of criminal conduct that the trial judge considered 
relevant to support probable cause was contained in paragraph 4. (See R. 127:12-13.) It 
stated that CI had been to the premises "numerous times, the most recent being within the 
last week to ten days, and [he/she] observed approx. 3 to 4 pounds of marijuana." (R. 
72, ^ [4.) Assuming, arguendo, the allegation may be read to support that the CI had 
observed 3 to 4 pounds of marijuana within the last week to ten days at the residence, it 
is insufficient.6 
In Gates, the United States Supreme Court reiterated that "an officer's statement 
that 'affiants have received reliable information from a credible person and believe that 
heroin is stored in a home, is likewise inadequate."' Gates. 462 U.S. at 239. 
As in Nathanson, this is a mere conclusory statement that gives the magistrate 
virtually no basis at all for making a judgment regarding probable cause. 
Sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to allow that official to 
determine probable cause; his action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare 
6 Paragraph 4 also is vague. In its literal sense, it supports that the CI had visited the 
premises on numerous occasions, and he/she observed approximately three to four pounds 
of marijuana. The phrase, "the most recent being within the last week to ten days," 
interrupts the actual message. Also, that phrase only serves to identify the most recent 
visit to the premises by the CI. It does not relate to the amount of marijuana observed 
during any visit in particular. Thus, in its literal sense, paragraph 4 should be read to 
support that the CI had visited the premises a number of times, with the most recent visit 
to have occurred within the last week to ten days. Also, over the course of his/her 
numerous visits, he/she observed approximately three to four pounds of marijuana. 
In the end, paragraph 4 fails to provide any particular or meaningful information. 
For example, did the CI observe marijuana and/or packaging material at the premises a 
week to ten days before his/her report to McCarthy, and if so, did the CI describe the 
observations in any detail? Since the search warrant ultimately hinged on paragraph 4, 
the magistrate should have demanded more. 
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conclusions of others. In order to ensure that such an abdication of the 
magistrate's duty does not occur, courts must continue to conscientiously review 
the sufficiency of affidavits on which warrants are issued. 
Id. An informant's report gains credence only through specific and detailed facts. 
Here, the affidavit taken as a whole fails to contain any detailed information. In 
sum, there are no pertinent facts about the CI to support veracity, and no details about 
his/her observations to support credibility. The affidavit fails to indicate how or where 
the CI observed the alleged marijuana in the home, what it looked like, or how it was 
packaged. The affidavit raises more questions than answers: who is the CI; what is 
his/her affiliation with Detective McCarthy; what did he/she observe beyond the general 
and unspecified use, possession and distribution of drugs and paraphernalia; when did 
he/she make his/her observations; when did he/she contact McCarthy; how did he/she 
contact McCarthy; what did he/she disclose to McCarthy in detail; where did he/she 
contact McCarthy; and what happened to the CI after his/her admitted criminal activity? 
Probable cause requires a degree of selectivity. General statements that the 
suspect lives in a home, drives a vehicle, and had marijuana in the home some time in the 
past few days does not provide adequate assurance to support the probability that 
evidence of crime will be found on the premises. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 239. Any 
person shielded by anonymity could report such generalities, thereby rendering the 
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement an exercise without accountability. If the 
informant is a drug user, as here, the general assertions about drug possession and use, 
31 
without necessary detail, should raise questions and suspicions. 
The lack of detail here failed to support probable cause. 
3. The Officer's "Corroboration" Was Inadequate. 
In Gates, the United States Supreme Court ruled that an anonymous letter was 
insufficient to support probable cause. The letter identified who the suspects were; where 
they lived; that "over $100,000.00 in drugs" could be found in their home in the base-
ment; that most of their drug buys took place in Florida; that the suspects made their 
living selling drugs; and that the suspects bragged about their drug transactions. It 
contained particular details as to how the suspects obtained drugs; particular details about 
the next planned drug buy; and a general description of the type of person who purchased 
drugs from the suspects. Also, the letter was written in the present tense. Gates, 462 U.S. 
at 225. "[T]he anonymous letter contained a range of details relating not just to easily 
obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip, but to future actions of third 
parties ordinarily not easily predicted." Id at 245. 
Notwithstanding the details, the Supreme Court ruled that standing alone, the 
anonymous letter to the police "would not provide the basis for a magistrate's determi-
nation that there was probable cause to believe contraband would be found in the Gates' 
car and home." Id, at 227. The Court ultimately upheld the warrant due to extensive 
police investigation. In doing so, it emphasized "the value of corroboration of details of 
an informant's tip by independent police work." Id. at 241. 
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Next, in Deluna, this Court stated that an officer "'may corroborate [a] tip either 
by observing the illegal activity or by finding [the material facts] substantially as 
described by the informant."9 Deluna, 2001 UT App 401, ^ [20 (citing Mulcahv. 943 P.2d 
at 236). Also, '"[w]here the reliability of the information is increased, less corroboration 
is necessary."' Deluna. 2001 UT App 401, Tf21 (Mulcahv. 943 P.2d at 236). 
In this case, as set forth above, the affidavit failed to support the reliability of the 
informant to any degree. (See supra, subpoint B. 1.) It also lacked adequate police 
investigation and corroboration. 
For example, while the CI reported information that may have been generally 
known or easy to verify (i.e., Saddler lived at the residence, he recently purchased the 
residence, and he used a vehicle), the lack of detail prevented the magistrate from 
assessing whether the CFs report was credible (see supra, subpoint B.2.), and it prevented 
the magistrate from assessing whether the detective was able to corroborate even innocent 
"[material facts] substantially as described by the informant." Deluna, 2001 UT App 401, 
1J20. That is, even if the detective was able to confirm facts concerning the residence and 
vehicles, the investigation would not bolster the credibility of the report since the report 
was vague in the first place. "[T]he informant did not supply a 'wealth of collateral 
detail.'" MickeL 765 P.2d at 333 (cite omitted). Thus, the magistrate judge was not able 
to scrutinize the detective's investigative efforts under the probable-cause standard. 
Next, with respect to the allegations of criminal conduct, the CI reported drug 
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trafficking, the suspect's "hours of operation," and that the suspect was home 
"infrequently and usually during the late evening hours." (R. 73, ^ [13,14.) 
Assuming, arguendo, the "hours of operation" were the "late evening hours" 
when the suspect "usually" was home (R. 73,1fl[l3,14), McCarthy was unable to confirm 
any "operation" during "late evening hours." According to the affidavit, "[d]uring the 
initial surveillance your affiant did not observe[] anyone at the residence, the surveillance 
was intermittent from 2000 hours until 0600 6/15/00." (R. 73.) 
After McCarthy engaged in the "initial surveillance" and observed nothing, he then 
engaged in a "surveillance on 06/15/00." According to the affidavit, McCarthy observed 
the following: 
During surveillance on 6/15/00 your affiant observed some short term traffic 
which your affiant believes was drug related. Your affiant had West Valley City 
Police Patrol perform a traffic stop on one of the vehicles leaving the listed 
premises. During the aforementioned traffic stop the driver was arrested for 
outstanding warrants and later found to be in possession of marijuana, 
approximately one half ounce. During the search of the vehicle a small section of 
plastic bag was found, by affiant, and appears to have residue of cocaine inside the 
twist section of the bag. Your affiant assisted in the search of the vehicle and 
would like to inform the courts that no drug paraphernalia, used in the ingestion of 
marijuana or cocaine, was located. Your affiant was told by the transporting 
officers, of the arrested person, that no drug paraphernalia was found on the 
subject, Oba Tramel. 
(R. 73.) McCarthy also summarized his investigation as follows: 
Your affiant has observed what your affiant believes to be drug traffic, short term 
traffic coming and going to the listed premises. Further one of the short visitors 
[Tramel] was stopped and found to be in possession of marijuana and packaging 
material with residue of cocaine. Further the arrested person was not found with 
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any instruments used in the ingestion of controlled substances, which your affiant 
believed shows that the marijuana was purchased from the listed premises. 
(R. 73-74.)7 Thereafter, on June 15, McCarthy prepared the affidavit for a search warrant 
and presented it to the magistrate. (R. 70-75.) The magistrate issued the warrant that day 
and specified that it was to be executed "in the day time." (R. 76-78.) McCarthy then 
executed the warrant on June 15. (R. 3.) 
The total circumstances relating to the June 15 surveillance raise several questions, 
and they constitute inadequate corroboration for the following reasons: 
First, while the affidavit specifies the hours of the "initial surveillance" (R. 73 
(intermittent from 2000 hours until 0600 6/15/00)), it does not specify the hours of the 
subsequent "surveillance on 6/15/00." (R. 73.) The affidavit suggests the "surveillance 
on 6/15/00" occurred during the day. (See R. 73 (describing "initial surveillance," 
followed by "surveillance on 6/15/00"); 76-78 (warrant issued and executed on June 15 
during the day ).) Where the suspect allegedly kept "hours of operation" during "the late 
7 McCarthy also reported that he observed "vehicles" at the premises and the 
"registered owner was [as] described by the CI." (R. 73.) That allegation apparently 
relates to the CI's report of the car used by Saddler. (See R. 73, ^ 13.) Since the officer 
was keeping surveillance on a home allegedly belonging to Saddler, his observation of the 
car used by Saddler fails to support criminal conduct. It is a vague and general 
observation that adds nothing to the analysis. 
Also, McCarthy reported that he was told "the suspect is usually only at home 
during the late evening hours and your affiant's observations have confirmed this." (R. 
74.) That assertion is unclear. During the "initial surveillance," which involved the late 
evening hours, McCarthy "did not observe anyone at the residence." (R. 73.) McCarthy 
failed to indicate in the affidavit when or how he observed "the suspect" at the residence. 
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evening," it is unclear what McCarthy hoped to observe during the day to support 
criminal conduct. The affidavit was unclear. It required more detail. 
Second, the affidavit failed to contain any specific detail regarding the June 15 
surveillance. McCarthy simply stated that during the surveillance, he "observed some 
short term traffic which your affiant believes was drug related." (R. 73.) The allegation 
was vague, ambiguous, and generally stated. For example, the report lacked information 
as to what McCarthy meant by "short term traffic" (e.g. 2 people or more visiting the 
residence), how long a "short term" visit lasted (e.g. 1 minute, 3-5 minutes or 30 
minutes), or what he observed to support his beliefs (e.g. did McCarthy observe the 
visitor engage in any furtive gesture once he/she was outside the house, or did he/she 
leave with a suspicious package or bulging pockets?). The investigation was inadequate. 
Third, McCarthy failed to set forth any detail regarding "Oba Tramel." According 
to McCarthy, Tramel was seen "leaving the listed premises" on June 15, and he was 
subsequently stopped for outstanding warrants and arrested. (R. 73-74.) In connection 
with the arrest, officers "later found" approximately one half ounce of marijuana to be in 
Tramel's "possession." In addition, McCarthy claimed that he located a plastic bag in the 
car and it "appear[ed] to have residue of cocaine inside the twist section of the bag." (R. 
73.) Although McCarthy did not specifically assert that Tramel obtained drugs from 
Saddler, he speculated with respect to such in the affidavit. (R. 74 ("affiant believe[s]... 
that the marijuana was purchased from the listed premises").) 
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McCarthy's investigation fails to support any relevant connection between Tramel, 
the residence, and/or drugs allegedly sold there. For example, there is no indication that 
McCarthy observed Tramel arrive at the home, that Tramel made contact with anyone at 
the home, that Tramel acted in a suspicious manner or made any furtive gestures when he 
left the home, that McCarthy made any effort to contact the CI to make a connection 
between Tramel and drugs at Saddler's home, that the drugs or packaging found in 
Tramp's possession resembled the quality of drugs or the kind of packaging described by 
the CI, and/or that McCarthy attempted to talk to Tramel about the drugs. (See R. 72-74.) 
McCarthy simply speculated about the matter. That is insufficient. See State v. Johnson. 
805 P.2d 761,764 (Utah 1991) (paucity of facts failed to support inference under 
reasonable-suspicion standard); Mulcahy. 943 P.2d at 234 {reasonable suspicion is a 
lower standard than probable cause). 
Also, where the officers who stopped Tramel "later found11 him "to be in pos-
session of marijuana" (R. 73), there is no information in the affidavit as to when the 
officers found the substance either in conjunction with Tramel leaving the residence or 
the traffic stop. Likewise, there is no information as to where the officers found the 
substance (e.g. whether the officers found the substance "on the subject, Oba Tramel" (R. 
73), wedged in the back seat, placed in the back of the glove compartment, or lodged in 
the spare tire compartment in the trunk), or whether the officers observed Tramel make 
any furtive or suspicious moves inside or around the car when he left the residence to 
37 
support that he may have placed the controlled substance in a particular place in 
connection with his visit. 
In short, without the necessary details, it is impossible to know how the controlled 
substance later found in Tramel's "possession" (R. 73) may be connected to the 
residence.8 
Also, while McCarthy claims he observed "cocaine residue" on a small section of 
plastic bag, there are no details about that observation (i.e. when or where the plastic bag 
was found and how it appeared). In addition, there is no indication that while the bag was 
in McCarthy's control, he attempted to perform any kind of field test on it to confirm his 
suspicions. (See R. 72 (McCarthy alleged to have training in drug investigation 
techniques).) Indeed, where McCarthy could provide specific details in the affidavit, 
either as the details related to the June 15 surveillance or the search of Tramel and his car, 
McCarthy chose to rely on vague assertions and speculation.9 
8 McCarthy also reported that officers did not find Tramel to be in possession of any 
drug paraphernalia. That assertion is irrelevant, particularly since the affidavit failed to 
reveal where the drugs were located in the car. For example, if officers found the drugs 
wedged in Tramel's back seat or stashed in the trunk, and officers did not observe Tramel 
reach into the back or go into the trunk after he left Saddler's house, those facts would 
suggest that the drugs were in the car before Tramel reached the residence, Tramel did not 
place the drugs in the car, Tramel did not know they were there, and/or he did not own the 
drugs. If Tramel did not own the drugs, it is likely that he also did not own paraphernalia. 
9 The affidavit also contained a paragraph concerning McCarthy's experience as a 
narcotics officer (R. 72), and a summary of McCarthy's investigative efforts. (R. 73-74.) 
The paragraph concerning McCarthy's experience does not specify how long he has 
worked in drug enforcement. (See R. 72.) 
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Finally, the criminal activity alleged in this case is the type of activity that lends 
itself to police surveillance and corroboration. As set forth in Gates. 462 U.S. at 241-43 
(identifying importance of corroboration, and extensive investigation that occurred in the 
case), independent corroboration is valuable to the analysis. Where an informant alleges 
drug trafficking, officers may investigate the claims and make observations consistent 
with drug trafficking patterns. See U.S. v. Warren. 42 F.3d 647, 652-53 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 
(officers established probable cause where they corroborated "a reliable informant's tip 
about drug activity at a residence by conducting a single controlled buy of illegal 
narcotics"; also, informant's proven track record supported reliability); U.S. v. Cook. 949 
F.2d 289,292 (10th Cir. 1991) (officer observed residence for 7 days, noted activity at 
night and coordinated controlled purchase); U.S. v. Scott. 91 F.3d 1058, 1061 (8th Cir. 
1996) (based on specific reports from two informants, officers observed a number of brief 
exchanges consistent with informants' description of crack cocaine sales); Purser. 828 
P.2d at 518 (officers corroborated reports through use of informant in two controlled 
purchases). Such patterns were not described in this case in any meaningful way. 
Indeed, the corroboration in this case was insufficient and lacked relevant detail. 
See Rushing v. State. 500 S.W.2d 667, 670 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (first-time informer's 
report of defendant in possession of marijuana with a certain companion in a two-tone 
green Ford pickup truck and officer's confirmation that defendant was with companion in 
the truck held insufficient to support probable cause for warrantless arrest/search); U.S. v. 
39 
Leake. 998 F.2d 1359, 1365 (6th Cir. 1993) (unidentified informant's report that he ob-
served 300 pounds of marijuana in defendant's home, "was not 'rich' in relevant detail11; 
also, officer's corroboration of house and vehicle registrations was insufficient); U.S. v. 
Gibson. 928 F.2d 250, 252-53 (8th Cir. 1991) (unknown informant's detailed description 
of home and drugs observed there, and officer corroboration of several innocent details 
including a description of the house and defendant's car deemed insufficient). 
The detective failed to provide relevant facts or details of unusual civilian or 
vehicular traffic at the address to support drug trafficking, and he failed to make any 
relevant connection between Tramel and the "listed premises." (R. 73.) 
In addition, the affidavit in this case failed to establish the reliability of the 
unknown CI and it failed to specify whether that informant disclosed any details to 
McCarthy. Where the affidavit failed to establish the reliability of the informant, more 
corroboration was needed. See Deluna, 2001 UT App 401, ^ [21. 
Under the totality of the circumstances in this case, the affidavit here failed to 
support probable cause. Saddler respectfully urges this Court to declare the warrant 
unlawful, to find the search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and to reverse the trial 
court's ruling on the motion to suppress. 
C. THE GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION DOES NOT SAVE THE WARRANT. 
According to the law, if an officer uses an unlawful warrant to conduct a search, 
the evidence obtained during execution of that warrant must be suppressed under the 
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exclusionary rule at trial. See State v. FixeL 744 P.2d 1366,1368-69 (Utah 1987) 
(recognizing that suppression is required if a search is rendered unconstitutional under 
traditional Fourth Amendment standards). The suppression of evidence is an appropriate 
remedy, where a police officer's search is unlawful and violates a fundamental right. 
The United States Supreme Court has articulated a "good faith" exception to the 
suppression remedy of the exclusionary rule. Under the "good faith" exception, if an 
officer relies in good faith on a search warrant that is later deemed to be unlawful, the 
evidence obtained in connection with the warrant need not be suppressed. See United 
State v. Leon. 468 U.S. 897,922 (1984). The reasonableness of the "good faith" reliance 
is viewed objectively. Id. 
Under the Fourth Amendment, objective "good faith" reliance on a warrant does 
not exist where (1) the affiant knew or should have known that the information was false; 
(2) the magistrate abandoned his role and failed to act neutrally; (3) the affidavit was so 
lacking in indicia of reliability that reliance thereon was unreasonable; or (4) the warrant 
was "so facially deficient - i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the 
things to be seized - that executing officers [could ]not reasonably presume it to be 
valid." Leon. 468 U.S. at 923; see also State v. Horton. 848 P.2d 708, 711 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993), cert denied. 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). 
In this case, Leon's "good faith" exception does not apply because the affidavit 
was so lacking in indicia of reliability that it was not reasonable for McCarthy to rely on 
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the search warrant. 
As set forth above, the affidavit here failed to support the reliability of the 
informant, and it failed to provide adequate detail with respect to the informant's 
allegations of criminal conduct. The affidavit contained vague, conclusory assertions. 
That was insufficient. In addition, McCarthy's independent investigation was irrelevant 
and inadequate. 
"When the magistrate reviewing the affidavit in support of the search warrant is 
not presented with sufficient facts to determine probable cause, the warrant cannot be 
relied upon by searching officers." State v. Rowe. 806 P.2d 730 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
(citing Leon. 468 U.S. at 920-23), reversed on other grounds. 850 P.2d 427 (Utah 1992); 
see Horton, 848 P.2d at 712; Droneburg. 781 P.2d at 1305. 
"Good faith" logically cannot exist if there are material omissions relating to the 
search warrant affidavit, the officer involved in the matter failed to engage in an adequate 
investigation regarding the allegations, and the officer who prepared/presented the 
affidavit was also involved in executing the warrant to effectuate the search. 
The "good faith" exception does not apply here. McCarthy could not rely in "good 
faith" on the warrant. McCarthy both prepared and presented the affidavit to the 
magistrate for the search warrant. The affidavit contained material omissions (see supra, 
subpoint B.l. and 2.), and reflected an inadequate police investigation (see supra, 
subpoint B.3.). Given McCarthy's experience and the insufficiencies here, the state is not 
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able to claim application of the "good faith" exception to this case. 
In this case, suppression is required where a trained officer should have known that 
the warrant was deficient despite the magistrate's authorization. See U.S. v. Hove. 848 
F.2d 137,139-140 (9th Cir. 1988); U.S. v. Baker. 894 F.2d 1144, 1149-50 (10th Cir. 
1990). This Court should reverse the trial judge's ruling on the motion to suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Saddler respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse and remand the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress. 
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Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/INTENT TO DIST 
CONTR/CNTRFT SUBST a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced 
to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
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ADDENDUM B 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
ADDENDUM C 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: s s 
Coun ty of S a l t Lake ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
BEFORE: 
JUDGE ADDRESS 
The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That he has reason to believe 
That (X) on the persons of Saddler, Anthony A,, 1/26/73, 
(X) on the premises known as 4300 West 3194 South, a 
single family dwelling, on the west side of the road, the front 
door faces to the east, the numbers 3194 South appear on the front 
of the home mail box in front of the home, to include all 
containers, locked and unlocked, rooms, attics, basements, 
outbuildings attached and unattached found within the curtilage. 
( ) in the vehicles described as N/A 
In the City of West Valley, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, 
there is now being possessed or concealed certain property or 
evidence described as: 
SEE ATTACHMENT "A" 
and that said property or evidence: 
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or 
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense/ or 
(X) is being possessed with he purpose to use it as a means 
of committing or concealing a public offense; or 
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct; 
( ) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a party to 
the illegal conduct. (Note requirements of Utah Code 
Annotated, 77-23-3(2) 
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is 
evidence of the crime (s) of Possession of Marijuana and Possession 
of Cocaine With Intent To Distribute. 




1. PACKAGING MATERIAL, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SCALES, 
PLASTIC BAGS, TAPE, 
2. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SYRINGES, 
SHORT STRAWS, GLASS PIPES FOR SMOKING CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES. 
3. RESIDENCY PAPERS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, UTILITY 
RECEIPTS AND OR BILLS, RENTAL/LEASE AGREEMENTS, AND ARTICLES 
SHOWING OCCUPANCY OF THE PREMISES, 
4. U.S. CURRENCY BELIEVED TO BE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE NARCOTICS 
BEING SEARCHED FOR. 
5. NARCOTIC RECORDATIONS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PRICE 
LIST, AMOUNTS SOLD, TIMES, DATES, AMOUNTS PURCHASED, AND 
ESPECIALLY DRUG INDEBTEDNESS. 
6. COCAINE, A WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER IN ROCK OR POWDER FORM, A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
7. MARIJUANA, A GREEN LEAFY MATERIAL, A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, 
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The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search 
Warrant are: 
Your affiant, Detective Bill McCarthy, 8022 , is employed 
by the West Valley City Police Department, and is currently 
assigned to the Neighborhood Narcotics Unit. Your affiant has been 
given the responsibility to investigate narcotic offenses occurring 
in West Valley City and surrounding areas. 
Your affiant has had training in narcotics identification 
and in the investigation of narcotics related offenses. Affiant has 
personally purchased various narcotics on numerous occasions in 
relation to police investigations. Affiant was previously assigned 
to the Metro Narcotics Strike Force and the Drug Enforcement Strike 
Force. Your affiant is a certified peace officer in the State of 
Utah for over 19 years. Your affiant's specialized training 
includes the DEA basic and advanced investigators seminars, as well 
as the California Narcotics Officers Association seminars in drug 
recognition, identification and investigative techniques. Your 
affiant is also certified in the investigation of Clandestine 
Methamphetamine Laboratories. Your affiant is a certified Bomb 
Technician. 
Your affiant is investigating Anthony A. Saddler for usage and 
distribution of controlled substances, specifically marijuana and 
cocaine. Your affiant received information from a confidential 
informant, hereinafter referred to as CI. Your affiant ask the 
courts not to require your affiant to publish the CI's name. Your 
affiant believes that the CI may be harmed if CI's name were 
published. Your affiant was told the following by the CI: 
1. CI has known the suspect, Saddler for over 1 year, 
2. CI has observed the suspect use cocaine and marijuana on 
numerous occasions during the last year, 
3. CI has used marijuana with the suspect on several 
occasions, 
4. CI has been to the premises numerous times, the most recent 
being within the last week to ten days, and observed approx. 3 to 
4 pounds of marijuana, 
5. CI has observed three scales inside the home, that the 
suspect uses to weigh out repackaged marijuana for resale, 
6. CI has observed cocaine inside the premises, along with 
packaging material, 
7. CI has observed the suspect carry marijuana and cocaine on 
his person, 
8. The suspect has told the CI that the suspect sells 
marijuana and cocaine, 
9. CI has observed the suspect sell and use controlled 
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AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF SEARCH WARRANT 
substances, inside the named premises, 
10. CI has been told by the suspect that the suspect recently 
purchased the listed premises, 
11. CI states that the suspect's only legitimate source of 
income is from a part time waiter's job at a Salt Lake City 
restaurant, BACCI's, 
12. CI states that the suspect sells controlled substances to 
be able to afford his own usage and as a separate source of income, 
13. CI provided a description of the home, a vehicle 
frequently used by the suspect (female companion of suspect), and 
hours of operation for the suspect, 
14. CI states that the suspect is home infrequently and 
usually during the late evening hours, 
Your affiant was performing surveillance on the suspect at his 
home address in West Valley on 6/14/00. During the initial 
surveillance your affiant did not observed anyone at the residence, 
the surveillance was intermittent from 2000 hours until 0600 
6/15/00. During surveillance on 6/15/00 your affiant observed some 
short term traffic which your affiant believes was drug related. 
Your affiant had West Valley City Police Patrol perform a traffic 
stop on one of the vehicles leaving the listed premises. During 
the aforementioned traffic stop the driver was arrested for 
outstanding warrants and later found to be in possession of 
marijuana, approximately one half ounce. During the search of the 
vehicle a small section of plastic bag was found, by affiant, and 
appears to have residue of cocaine inside the twist section of the 
bag. Your affiant assisted in the search of the vehicle and would 
like to inform the courts that no drug paraphernalia, used in the 
ingestion of marijuana or cocaine, was located. Your affiant was 
told by the transporting officers, of the arrested person, that no 
drug paraphernalia was found on the subject, Oba Tramel. 
Your affiant believes that the observations of the CI are 
first hand, accurate and truth full, for the following reasons. 
CI's observations are first hand and from a person that has used 
marijuana and would recognized the substance when observed. CI has 
not been promised nor paid for any of the information provided. CI 
has provided the information out of a sense of guilt and desire to 
stop the sales and usage of controlled substances into the 
community. CI's observations were over a long period of time, even 
though the suspect has only recently occupied the listed premises, 
within the last couple of months. CI states that the illicit sales 
operation is ongoing and has been long term. 
Your affiant observed vehicles described by CI at the named 
premises and the registered owner was a described by CI. Your 
affiant has observed what your affiant believes to be drug traffic, 
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short term traffic coming and going to the listed premises. 
Further one of the short visitors was stopped and found to be in 
possession of marijuana and packaging material with residue of 
cocaine. Further the arrested person was not found with any 
instruments used in the ingestion of controlled substances, which 
your affiant believed shows that the marijuana was purchased from 
the listed premises. 
Your affiant was told that the suspect is home infrequently 
and works at a restaurant in Salt Lake City. Your affiant was 
told that the employment is part time, your affiant checked on 
6/15/00 and the suspect was not at work and it was unknown when he 
was scheduled to return. 
Your affiant believes that the premises should be searched for 
marijuana, cocaine and associated packaging material and 
instruments used to ingest controlled substances. Affiant has been 
told that all these items have been observed inside the listed 
premises. Your affiant believes that the suspect should be 
searched, affiant has been told that the suspect sells, uses and 
carries controlled substances on his person. 
Your affiant prays for any time , announced authority of 
service. Your affiant has been told that the suspect is usually 
only at home during the late evening hours and your affiant's 
observations have confirmed this. 
Your affiant has reviewed the attached affidavit with Deputy 
Salt Lake County District Attorney B. Kent Morgan and it has ben 
approved to be presented to the courts for anytime and announced 
authority of service. 
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WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for 
the seizure of said items: 
( ) in the day time, 
(X) at any time day or night because there is reason to 
believe it is necessary to seize the property prior 
to it being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or 
altered, or for other good reasons to wit: 
SEE BODY OF AFFIDAVIT 
It is further requested that (if appropriate) the officer executing 
the requested warrant not be required to give notice of the 
officer's authority or purpose because: 
( ) physical harm may result to any person if notice 
were given; or 
( ) the property sought may be quickly destroyed, 
disposed of, or secreted. 
N/A 
< SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this / 5 day of fl^2°°°' 
Time 
JUDC 
IN THE fTH^ KD DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND EOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
ADDENDUM D 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
NO 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
To any peace officer in the state of Utah. 
Proof by affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by Det. 
Bill McCarthy, I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe 
That (X) on the persons of Saddler, Anthony A., 1/26/73, 
(X) on the premises known as 4300 West 3194 South, a single family 
dwelling, on the west side of the road, the front door faces to the east, the 
numbers 3194 South appear on the front of the home mail box in front of the 
home, to include all containers, locked and unlocked, rooms, attics, 
basements, outbuildings attached and unattached found within the curtilage. 
( ) in the vehicles described as N/A 
In the City of West Valley, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, 
bhere is now being possessed or concealed certain property or evidence 
described as: 
SEE ATTACHMENT "A" 
tfhich property or evidence: 
(x) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed or 
(x) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense or 
(x) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of 
committing or concealing a public offense or 
(x) consist of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, 
possessed by a party to the illegal conduct. 
ou are therefore commanded: 
*r 
in the day time^  
at any time of the day or night (good cause having been shown) 
to execute without notice of authority or purpose, 
(proof under oath being shown that the object of this 
search may be quickly destroyed or disposed of or 
that harm may result to any person if notice were given.) 




1. PACKAGING MATERIAL, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SCALES, 
PLASTIC BAGS, TAPE, 
2. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SYRINGES, 
SHORT STRAWS, GLASS PIPES FOR SMOKING CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES. 
3. RESIDENCY PAPERS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, UTILITY 
RECEIPTS AND OR BILLS, RENTAL/LEASE AGREEMENTS, AND ARTICLES 
SHOWING OCCUPANCY OF THE PREMISES, 
4. U.S. CURRENCY BELIEVED TO BE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE NARCOTICS 
BEING SEARCHED FOR. 
5. NARCOTIC RECORDATIONS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PRICE 
LIST, AMOUNTS SOLD, TIMES, DATES, AMOUNTS PURCHASED, AND 
ESPECIALLY DRUG INDEBTEDNESS. 
6. COCAINE, A WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER IN ROCK OR POWDER FORM, A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
7. MARIJUANA, A GREEN LEAFY MATERIAL, A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, 
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to make a s e a r c h of t h e above-named o r d e s c r i b e d p e r s o n ( s ) , v e h i c l e ( s ) , and 
p remises f o r t h e h e r e i n - a b o v e d e s c r i b e d p r o p e r t y o r e v i d e n c e and i f you f i nd 
the same o r any p a r t t h e r e o f t o b r i n g i t f o r t h w i t h b e f o r e me a t t h e T h i r d 
D i s t r i c t C o u r t , County of S a l t Lake , S t a t e o f U t a h , o r r e t a i n such p r o p e r t y 
in your c u s t o d y , s u b j e c t t o t h e o r d e r o f t h i s c o u r t . 
3IVEN UNDER MY HAND and d a t e d t h i s /s day of % 2000. 
ADDENDUM E 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEST VALLEY DEPT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : Case No. 011101571 FS 
Plaintiff, 
! v 
ANTHONY A. SADDLER, 
Defendant. 
i SEPTEMBER 11,2001 MOTION TO SUPPRESS Page 1 
I SEPTEMBER 25,2001 CHANGE OF PLEA HEARING Tab 1 
! BEFORE 
! THE HONORABLE TERRY CHRISTIANSEN 
CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR Hun cv '^T/ ; ; p a l s 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER
 / r„. , , ' f 
1775 East Ellen Way A " ^ 
Sandy, Utah 84092 ^•^' , • -(:i »y3 ! 
801-523-1186 ciaikciow court -fo^* 




think that's sufficient. 
THE COURT: All right. Both sides submit it, 




MS. ROMERO: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. As set forth in today's 
memorandum, the magistrate does make a comment since 





totality of the circumstances. I have reviewed now the 
affidavit that supports the search warrant. I've read both 
memorandums. In this particular case you have an experienced 
police officer, Officer McCarthy. He indicates that he has 19 
12 ' years of experience. He indicates that there are a number of 
13 J matters besides the affidavit. The most telling certainly is 
14 j that Paragraph 4, the CI identifies numerous times, the most 
15 ; recent being within the last week that he had observed three to 
16 
17 
four pounds of marijuana. 
I agree with Ms. Romero that many of the other 
18 j allegations are rather broad and vague and without Paragraph 4, 
19 (inaudible) issue, it would not support the issuance of the 
20 j search warrant but I'm thinking you have to look at the other 
21 | allegations with are very general in conjunction with Paragraph 
22 4 which is very specific. In this particular case, the 
! 
23 i confidential informant indicates that that within a week to ten 
i 
i 
24 i days, he says there was three to four pounds of marijuana in 
25 the defendant's residence. The detective does not simply take 
12 
that at face value. He does some corroboration of (inaudible) 
surveillance of suspect at his home address in West Valley on 
June 14th. Surveillance on, it looks like June 15th. On June 15th 
he observes short term traffic which (inaudible) believes were 
drug related. It goes on to explain that. Based on all the 
circumstances with the totality of the situation, I do believe 
that Judge Maughn was justified in issuing the search warrant; 
therefore, I am denying the Motion to Suppress. 
MR. MCCULLAGH: Your Honor, pretrial? 
THE COURT: Set it for pretrial? 
MS. ROMERO: Yeah. 
MR. MCCULLAGH: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. We'll set pretrial on September 25 
at 8:30. Is that a good day for both counsel? 
MR. MCCULLAGH: It is, Your Honor. 
MS. ROMERO: It is, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you want me to set a trial date at 
this time or wait until pretrial? 
MR. MCCULLAGH: Why don't we wait until the pretrial? 
MS. ROMERO: Yeah. 
THE COURT: All right. Court is in recess. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
(C) 
13 
